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A liberal Marxism? 
 
Frederick Harry Pitts 
 




This article surveys The Norman Geras Reader: What’s There is There, a recent collection of 
the work of Norman Geras edited by Eve Garrard and Ben Cohen, in order to explore the 
relevance of Geras’s attempted reconciliation between liberalism and Marxism to some of the 
key issues confronting the contemporary left: foreign policy and the failures of humanitarian 
intervention or the lack thereof; internationalism and the necessity for solidarity across borders 
in an age of nationalist populism; left approaches to totalitarianism and antisemitism; the 
possibilities and limitations of alternatives to and critiques of liberal capitalism; and the 
reinvigoration of utopian imaginaries and the futures they promise. It suggests that important 
lessons for the left can be unpicked from the contested legacy of the ‘decent leftism’ Geras 
represents, where reapplied in the wake of new political and diplomatic challenges. 
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Introduction: Articles of conciliation 
[T]o be a member of the Marxist left today is to be part of something, a body of opinion, a 
political current, that is accursed […]. Today, in the light of what has happened in the first 
decade of the 21st century, it is not so easy, if you believe in human rights and the importance 
of the fundamental civic and political freedoms that we owe to historical liberalism, to find a 
Marxist left that is worth belonging to or being broadly identified with. [T]he Marxist left is a 
place of the most disgraceful apologetics and ambiguous or worse than ambiguous alignments 
[…] from within which after 9/11 there came voices ready to make excuses for an act of mass 
murder that the whole left should have forthrightly condemned. And which, more generally, is 
always free with forms of ‘understanding’ of terrorism – by another name, murder of the 
innocent […]. And who have been so convinced that there was only one possible, one legitimate 
viewpoint on the left about the war in Iraq that they have reacted to others on the left who didn’t 
share that viewpoint as if they could no longer be of the left. These are often the same people, 
incidentally – these unswervingly convinced-of-one-viewpoint ones – as opposed the US-led 
response to 9/11 that overthrew Taliban rule in Afghanistan, as opposed Nato’s intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999, and as opposed to eviction of Saddam Hussein’s armies from Kuwait in 1991, 
and as opposed the eviction of Argentina from the Falklands in 1982 […]. And who, again some 
of them, treat the right of nations to self-determination as unproblematically to be recognized 
for many peoples but not, apparently, in the case of the Jews […]. To put it briefly and bluntly, 
I read. I read what goes on in the opinion pages of the national press, and so far from these 
tropes being confined to the far left […] they extend even beyond […] into broadly ‘progressive’ 
circles that would not willingly own to the name Marxist. This is, if you want, an ironic and 
distorted coming to fruition of the notion of Gramscian hegemony.1 
This scathing indictment of the contemporary left was delivered by Norman Geras in 
January 2011. What would Geras, who passed away in 2013, have made of how the 
same hegemonic politics he skewers has now seized Her Majesty’s Opposition? 
Geras had little tolerance for the injunction that ‘there are no opponents on the left’ 
(117). Whilst at the time of writing the left’s proximity to power places an imperative 
upon its partisans to suspend judgement out of fear for the alternatives, the fallout 
from the General Election could well create demand on the left for intellectual 
alternatives to the political tradition with which Corbyn’s leadership is associated. In 
the shadow of the so-called ‘decent left’, what resources for such a rethink does the 
recent edited collection of Geras’s work, The Norman Geras Reader: What’s there is 
there, reveal? 
As Alan Johnson explains in his preface to the book, Geras was committed to the task 
- unfashionable then and more unfashionable now, as even someof liberalism’s most 
dogged former supporters throw in their lot with populist nativism - of ‘work[ing] out the 
shape of articles of conciliation (not surrender) between Marxism and liberalism’ (11). 
For Geras, where the former lacks, the latter provides. Chiefly, for Geras, this lack lies 
in Marxism’s incomplete delineation of a ‘theory of political democracy that would be 
adequate to coping with so far-reaching a task’ as the ‘transformation of the world’ 
(108). This lack, as Johnson points out, comes back to ‘a series of disabling anti-
democratic and illiberal tendencies’ lurking within some Marxism, not least an 
‘insouciance about ‘bourgeois’ democratic rights’ (10). Whilst a ‘frankly, unashamedly 
liberal Marxism […] might look unfamiliar to many in the way of Marxist intellectual 
work’, for Geras it is pressing upon Marxists to realise that 
Unless, today and tomorrow, Marxists show themselves willing to engage fully with the 
intellectual resources of liberalism […]; unless a Marxist political theory comes to terms with 
the truths of liberal political theory, acknowledging the normative force of human rights, the idea 
of judicial independence and separation of powers, exploring different forms of representation, 
insisting on free elections and an untrammelled freedom of speech and opinion, understanding 
the virtues of political pluralism; unless all of that, Marxism as a political movement might as 
well shut up shop. (108) 
This reconciliation rests on the assumption that ‘there are tenets of liberalism not 
indissolubly bound up with capitalism’, namely its attempts to ‘set limits to the 
accumulation and abuse of political power, […] protecting the physical and mental 
space of individuals from unwarranted invasion’. It has done so historically through 
‘evolving institutions and practices, political and juridical, to contribute to such ends.’ 
As Geras permits, the protection of capitalist property has often been the imperative 
at play in these initiatives (56). And, as he points out, the formal equality and equivalent 
exchange on which liberal society is based are appearances of capitalist social 
relations that conceal a disequilibrium at their core – albeit through illusions that are 
objective and not simply ‘false’ (68-77). Moreover, and more pressingly,  
the principal economic formation historically associated with liberalism […] today as much as 
ever is one in which it has been the norm for the wealth and comfort of some to be obtained 
through the hardship and poverty of others, and to stand right alongside these. (171) 
As such Marxism should in no way be uncritical of liberal political forms (108). But this 
does not mean we should discount them ‘on the basis only of a present confidence in 
some future spontaneous harmony.’ As the contemporary left preoccupies itself with 
such visions, the ‘evils’ that confront us are often precisely those ‘against which liberal 
institutions have given some protection’ (56). Paradigmatically, for Geras liberalism 
has concerned itself with ‘negative duties only’ based in non-interference. But another 
liberalism is possible which allows for ‘duties of active intervention and supportive 
material provision’ (170).  
 
Mutual care 
For Geras it is socialism that holds the greatest capacity to embrace this spirit of 
mutual aid and care. A liberal socialism represents 
a rule-governed, normative system, constraining its members as well as benefitting them, 
curbing evils amongst them as well as encouraging and generating goods, requiring duties as 
well as upholding and protecting rights. Amongst these duties would be the duty of aid. A 
serious-minded view of socialism today […] is dependent for its consistency and realism on the 
centrality of the imperative of mutual care. (171-2) 
This idea of a liberal socialism constructed around a duty of care is applied most 
notably by Geras to the question of humanitarian intervention - a topic the heated 
debate over which has not let up erupting on the left as the cycle of violence in the 
Middle East has spiralled out of control in past decades. Against the ‘contract of mutual 
indifference’ that characterises the impoverished liberalism of present society (58), 
Geras makes an appeal to the embedding within Marxism and socialism of an ethics 
many of its proponents have been loathe to embrace (NGR, 56). For Geras, the chief 
ethical commitment is a categorical imperative of ‘multivious care’ (58) insofar as  
If you do not come to the aid of others who are under grave assault, in acute danger or crying 
need, you cannot reasonably expect others to come to your aid in similar emergency; you 
cannot consider them so obligated to you. (57) 
Contrary to the deep ambivalence and open hostility many contemporary socialists 
show towards any kind of concerted military or humanitarian intervention in conflict 
zones, for Geras ‘a socialist ethic’ worth its salt ‘would have to incorporate – integrally 
– duties of aid and rescue’ (59). The difficulty is that questions such as ‘What does 
each of us owe to other people in the way of aid or rescue when their situation is […] 
life-threateningly dire?’ or ‘What is the extent of our duty to others under such 
circumstances […]?’ have not traditionally fallen within the purview of Marxism, despite 
Geras’s attempts in the late 1980s to persuade Marxists to take seriously issues of 
morality. But, as Geras asserts, ‘they should be questions of interest to Marxists, since 
the notion of solidarity, including international solidarity, has been important to 
Marxists’ (107). 
It is strange, considering this preoccupation with solidarity, that many socialists seem 
consistently so unwilling to countenance of any kind of humanitarian action no matter 
what the human cost of inaction. For Geras this is because there is no ethics of guilt 
that can go along with the consequences of non-intervention. In delineating such an 
ethics of guilt capable of guiding the socialist construction of cross-national solidarities, 
Geras draws upon the work of the German philosopher Karl Jaspers. Geras (168) 
quotes Jaspers’ suggestion that 
There exists a solidarity among men as human beings that makes each co-responsible for 
every wrong and every injustice in the world, especially for crimes committed in his presence 
or with his knowledge. If I fail to do whatever I can to prevent them, I too am guilty.  
[…] 
Metaphysical guilt is the lack of absolute solidarity with the human being as such – an indelible 
claim beyond morally meaningful duty. This solidarity is violated by my presence at a wrong or 
a crime. It is not enough that I cautiously risk my life to prevent it; if it happens, and if I was 
there, and if I survive where the other is killed, I know from a voice within myself: I am guilty of 
still being alive. 
What appears to prohibit such a feeling of responsibility towards one’s fellow humans 
among some members of the left is the prioritisation of a principle that is not altogether 
incompatible with solidarity but for various reasons stands in its way in the calculations 
made by socialists over whether to call for the states in which they live and vote to 
step in and help or not: state sovereignty. As Geras’s much-maligned Euston 
Manifesto asserted, sovereignty should be ‘lodg[ed] properly within the ‘common life’ 
of all peoples’ (117) such that 
If in some minimal sense a state protects the common life of its people (if it does not torture, 
murder and slaughter its own civilians, and meets the most basic needs of life), then its 
sovereignty is to be respected. But if the state itself violates this common life in appalling ways, 
its claim to sovereignty is forfeited and there is a duty upon the international community of 
intervention and rescue. (117) 
To this extent, the international legal notions of Responsibility to Protect and Crimes 
Against Humanity imply ‘a limit to state sovereignty’ (184). There is also implied, as 
the UK’s Chief Prosecutor at Nuremburg asserted, ‘a limit upon the omnipotence of 
the state vis-à-vis the individual human being’, with the needs of the latter better served 
by an intervening force. But the left also rallies its own legalistic arguments to the 
contrary. This usually rests on the United Nations Charter article protecting the 
‘territorial integrity or political independence’ of states against outside interference, 
which is placed above other purposes of the UN, such as ‘the defence of human rights’ 
(185), or indeed the pre-UN ‘customary international law doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention’. Geras (186) quotes Michael Walzer, who highlights how situations arise 
whereby ‘the violation of human rights within a set of boundaries is so terrible that it 
makes talk of community or self-determination […] seem cynical and irrelevant’. 
These knotty issues expose a contradiction which has become only too clear in recent 
years, as Russia has successively wielded the UN Security Council veto preventing 
action against the Assad regime in Syria. This is that the UN both exists to oversee 
and protect human rights across the globe whilst also on occasion being the biggest 
obstacle to the achievement of this aim (186). For Geras, only a ‘gravely deficient’ 
‘system of international law’ would respect ‘the sovereignty of a regime that had just 
carried out a genocide […] but was no longer doing so’, or that was ‘murdering and 
torturing large numbers of people but never on a scale one could describe as either 
genocidal or such as to precipitate a general humanitarian crisis’, or that ‘presided 
over people starving to death through its own misrule’ (188). Often the recourse of the 
socialist left is to the prospect of justice after the act, rather than prevention before or 
during it – all will be well, this says, should Assad and Putin be tried in the Hague. But 
for Geras what is important is prevention. He presents his own threshold for 
humanitarian intervention based in the socialist ethic of solidarity expressed above, 
reached ‘in two sets of circumstances’: 
a) when a state is on the point of committing (or permitting), or is actually committing (or 
permitting), or has recently committed (or permitted) massacres and other atrocities against its 
own population of genocidal, or tendentially genocidal, scope; or 
b) when, even short of this, a state commits, supports or overlooks murders, tortures and other 
extreme brutalities or deprivations such as to result in a regular flow of thousands of victims. 
(188) 
Of course, provision for this approach already exists, in ‘the international law on 
genocide in force since 1948; and the more recent doctrine of a responsibility to 
protect’ affirmed by the UN General Assembly in 2005 (189). But even in the latter the 
‘collective nature of the undertaking’ can sometimes undermine ‘the commitment to 
timeliness and decisiveness’, as we see where the veto is wielded to prevent UNSC 
authorisation. Indeed, in recent years voices on the left  have appealed to the need for 
this authorisation seemingly in full knowledge that the action proposed would fall 
before the veto for political and not juridical reasons – in the Syrian case, owing to an 
ally of the same brutal regime the action would target. ‘In these circumstances’, Geras 
suggests, ‘a right of humanitarian intervention must devolve to the constituent nations 
of the UN’. The West’s noughties incursions in the Middle East have weakened the 
political legitimacy of such ‘unilateral intervention’ (190), even, as in Syria, where the 
template of Iraq makes for an ill fit against the facts on the ground. But, as Geras writes 
The member nations of the body that has taken on the commitment to a responsibility to protect 
are severally and separately authors of this commitment and they cannot reasonably be 
considered bound by the delinquency – for that is what it is – of which the collective body, the 
UN, is guilty when it fails to respond effectively to genocide or crimes against humanity on a 
large scale. (190) 
For Geras this is akin to a state of natural law such as that identified by Locke, the 
execution of which is, as Geras quotes (191), ‘put into every man’s hands, whereby 
every one has a right to punish the transgressors’ and to ‘hinder its violation’, because 
that law depends upon a categorical imperative upon all to defend it otherwise it is 
meaningless. This places ‘moral right’ above the legality on which left appeals to non-
intervention often rests (196). Where this ‘legality’ cannot ensure the prevention of 
what transgresses the prevention of and protection of humans from crimes against 
their common humanity, it does not ‘carry moral weight’ and as such is trumped (196). 
It sometimes jars to see leftists hiding behind a system of ‘bourgeois’ law they would 
in other spheres dismiss and see as merely a cloak for capital to exploit and 
accumulate, sometimes in favour of authoritarian states where the rule of law is 
suspended (127). But even still ‘[i]t is law that needs to be criticized, opposed, and 
changed. It needs to be moved forward – which happens in this domain by precedent 
and custom as well as by transnational treaty and convention’ (197). 
 
Planetary consciousness 
On what social or political basis can these notions of moral or natural right be 
reconciled with Marx? In his major 1987 intervention in the debate about Marx and 
morality, Geras identifies in Marx a denied affinity with natural right based upon a 
conception of intergenerational solidarity between members of shared humanity (90). 
For Geras, it is this shared humanity to which the rights above are addressed, ‘a global 
human community in which an obligation to come to the assistance of others in danger 
or distress was widely felt as amongst the most powerful of imperatives, moving 
people to action […]; making of shame, and the foretaste of it, an effective, mobilizing 
norm of social life’ (169-170). But the ‘political’ problem confronts us of how we can, 
in a world divided by nations and classes, found the ‘social constituency, the means 
and the strategies, that might succeed in moving us towards the alternative moral 
universe in view’ (180). This is a political imperative because, to encourage the 
‘planetary consciousness’ (217) of a global human subject prepared to step in and act 
out of solidarity with others ‘is scarcely thinkable without the robust democratic political 
institutions and the egalitarian economic and social relations that would be apt to those 
more caring dispositions and promote them’ (180). 
The foundations for Geras’s politics of global humanity were set in his engagement 
with the question of human nature in Marx, of which he argued there was a persuasive 
and transhistorical conceptualisation that had an ‘explanatory and normative 
significance for a self-emancipatory politics’, as Johnson puts it (11). The significance 
here pertains not so much to the question of human nature itself but the notion of 
human limits that, in the Marxist literature, gets chucked out with it (11). For Geras, 
this runs against the grain of ‘[t]he influential thinkers of Marxism’, who ‘were serious 
people, not fools. They did not believe […] in the possibility of a world free of all 
limitation and difficulty’ (51). The ability of some quarters of the Marxist left to have 
overcome this radically pessimistic recognition of the intractability of contradiction 
owes, for Geras, to the rejection of a transhistorical human nature around which other 
political realities and communities can be constituted. And this is linked in turn to the 
reduction of all questions to a ‘roots-cause sociology’ (110) that emphasises class and 
capitalism above all other considerations: 
Marxism is as familiar as any other intellectual tradition with the realities of human violence and 
oppression and the more negative traits and potentialities in the makeup of human beings. At 
the same time […] there has always been a tendency within this tradition to minimize, or 
sometimes just deny, the independent force of such negative characteristics. They come to be 
treated, generically, as the product of class societies and, today, as the product of capitalism. 
The affinity between this overall intellectual tendency within Marxist and other left thinking, and 
the practical reductionism […] in which America is identifies as the source of all worldly wrongs 
[…] should be transparent. (126) 
This conflict between, on one hand, an understanding of human nature and human 
limits, and, on the other, a class or capital reductionism, plays out for Geras in the 
explanations offered by Marxists of the horrors of the Holocaust. He critiques Ernest 
Mandel in particular for the position that ‘the destruction of the Jews of Europe is 
rationally explicable as the product of imperialist capitalism’ (142), as well as the 
vulgarised version of the Frankfurt School position that explains ‘the catastrophe as a 
product of modernity’ (145). At the same time, Geras does not support ‘any radical 
incomprehensibility thesis’ (145). But the Marxist project of comprehending, as Geras 
(143) quotes Mandel as saying, ‘all aspects of social activity as connected with and 
structurally coordinated to one another’, does not quite capture how ‘there is a residue 
within this historical experience beyond the regular forms of social, political or 
ideological explanation’ (145). What reductionist accounts of the Shoah present is  
a picture of rule-governed, bureaucratic murder in which some of the other aspects […], 
symbolic, emotional and to do with the unfettered ‘play’ of destructive human capacity and 
imagination, are all but marginalized. There is something here that is not about modernity; 
something that is not about capitalism either. It is about humanity. (154) 
To demonstrate what that something is, Geras returns to the work of a figure 
foundational to his own thought, as well as some of the same reductionist strands of 
Marxism he seeks to critique: Trotsky. The latter’s account of a pogrom details, 
lengthily and sickeningly, a mob ‘drunk on the smell of blood’.  Trotsky ‘had seen the 
spirit of limitless excess, the exaltation people can feel in exercising a merciless power 
over others and the ‘total-ness’ there can be in a humiliation’. And, in this, ‘he had 
seen part of what there would subsequently be in Shoah, including the element of an 
irreducible choice. The preconditions and the surrounding context of this kind of choice 
can and always must be explored and described. But it remains in the end what it is: 
undetermined, a choice’ (151). 
The failure of the Marxist search for a ‘materialist’ explanation of this and other 
expressions of fascist and racist loathing and violence – often in the process eliding 
the material force of ideas – lies in a lack of any conception of human nature around 
which an understanding of limits and imperfections can be harboured. Marxism has 
framed its ‘projection of possible futures in terms that exclude the less benign, the 
more troublesome, features of the human make-up as it has revealed itself historically’ 
in ‘ordinary and extraordinary experience’ spanning ‘the most familiar situations of 
daily life to the torture chambers and the killing fields’. It is the sum of this history that 
suggests ‘enduring human limitations such as could continue to blemish and unsettle 
even the best-placed social order’ (53). And this is why the well-worn proposal of 
socialism, pure and simple, as a solution to all humanity’s ills cannot escape its own 




In Geras’s conceptualisation of ‘minimum utopia’, several strands of the above come 
together: the political project of building a social constituency for the notion of rights 
attached to a global humanity, working through and within the limits set upon us by 
human nature, and the escape from Marxist determinism to embrace instead ‘articles 
of conciliation’ with liberalism. Minimum utopia, in short, represents 
a condition in which people had enough to eat, adequate water, shelter, health care, and the 
fundamental rights of expression, belief and assembly; and in which they were free from 
arbitrary imprisonment, torture, ‘disappearance’, threat of genocide. (53) 
The idea of ‘minimum utopia’ begins from, rather than seeks to liquidate, ‘that most 
complex being’ (32), the human subject, and ‘comes to terms with the likely 
persistence of some of the less pleasant tendencies and potentialities that are lodged 
within the characteristic make-up of human beings’ (11), a reckoning many forms of 
Marxism seem incapable of, opting for abstract utopias that ‘invent in place of what 
they lack’ (49). Rather minimum utopia works within the limits that define human 
nature. The attempt to escape a world of limits and contrasts is what makes ‘pure 
utopias […] seem so flat and dull’ (54). They ‘lack the necessary contrasts that in any 
actual world make the goods of life what they are, to be valued and strived for against 
the basis’. Moreover, ‘happiness is scarcely conceivable except by way of its 
juxtaposition’. Geras turns to Primo Levi to root this in an inescapable human condition 
that places limits on joy as well as grief: ‘Perfect happiness and perfect unhappiness 
are equally unattainable […] the obstacles to them deriving from the human condition 
itself, ‘which is opposed to everything infinite’ owing to the ‘certainty of death’ (Geras 
54). This runs against the grain of contemporary forms of left utopianism which root 
themselves in an imaginary of technologically-enabled abundance and infinitude 
capable of challenging human limits. 
One of the main prospects heralded by the new left utopians is a workless land of 
automated plenty, for which the textual authority of Marx himself is cited as 
incontrovertible theoretical support. But as Geras points out, Marx never proposes, as 
some appear to think, the elimination, with labour, of a ‘realm of necessity’, but rather 
implies the continued imperative of work ‘that is not free creation or self-realization but 
‘determined by necessity and external expediency’’ (96). This being our lot in this 
world, the best we can ask is the small mercy of ‘a simple sufficiency of the means 
and conveniences of life’ (51). This also has the effect of legitimating distributive 
struggles as themselves struggles over whose hands the conditions of producing the 
world lie (72). 
 
Conclusion 
Even amidst election exuberance, the left now reckons with a vast generational 
experience of defeat centring on a bad run Geras was not around to witness: the rise 
of a globe-spanning and electorally dynamic ‘nationalist international’, Russian 
intervention in Syria, the breakdown of international codes of conduct on the use of 
chemical weapons, the Brexit referendum and the election of Trump in the US. This 
context suggests that before we can even begin to plan for minimum utopias - let alone 
maximum ones - the imperative falls upon us to defend what is already in place:  
[F]lawed as they may be, the capitalist democracies are democracies, whereas none of the 
would-be anti-capitalist countries, anywhere, has managed to sustain comparably good or 
better democratic institutions over any length of time. [T]he democratic institutions we are 
familiar with have yet to be improved on in any of those places that some leftists are given to 
casting an indulgent eye upon even while they seek to distance themselves critically from the 
political institutions of their own countries, institutions from which they benefit and which are 
superior. Unwilling to profess a clear allegiance towards what is democratically better, a certain 
type of leftist is always ready to make allowances for what is democratically worse. (112-3) 
Today this liberalism is on the backfoot everywhere, the whipping boy of left and right 
alike. The irony is that the contemporary left, for whom ‘liberal’ is a byword for 
complicity and complacency, carries over many of the worst aspects of liberalism – a 
dogged belief in progress at all costs, the assumption that a unified social and political 
constituency is possible in a society founded in riven by the class relation – whilst only 
intermittently having the confidence to defend and superintend its best – international 
institutional order, global human rights, the incomplete working through of 
contradictions via open debate and deliberation, the expansion of civil society as a 
protective barrier between individuals and overweening states. All too often lumped in 
with ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘capitalism’, with Marx called as a witness against it, Geras 
shows that liberalism is much more than a mere political and ethical cloak for 
exploitation and accumulation, and has vital lessons from which the left is slowly 
learning in an age of authoritarian populism – in the case of Corbynism, at home if not 
always abroad. 
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